The South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC) is the country’s public broadcaster, offering a broad portfolio of audiovisual services. As of mid-2025, it operates four television channels—three of which are free-to-air and one via subscription—as well as 18 radio stations catering to all 11 official languages, in addition to community and commercial radio services. In the digital space, SABC also runs SABC Plus, an Over-The-Top (OTT) streaming platform, relaunched in July 2024 with revamped functionality and expanded original content offerings to compete in a crowded digital ecosystem.
Media assets
Television: SABC1, SABC2, SABC3, SABC News
Radio: Ikwekwezi FM, Lesedi FM, Ligwalagwala FM, Lotus FM, Motsweding FM, Munghana Lonene FM, Phalaphala FM, Radio 2000, RSG, SAfm, Thobela FM, Tru FM, Ukhozi FM, Umhlobo Wenene FM, 5FM, Channel Africa, Good Hope FM, Metro FM
State Media Matrix Typology
Captured Public/State-Managed (CaPu)
Ownership and governance
SABC’s governance is underpinned by the Broadcasting Act, as amended, which defines its structure and role. The Board of Directors—comprising non-executive members appointed by the President in consultation with Parliament—remains the highest decision-making authority. The board subsequently selects the executive team in agreement with the Minister of Communications following a public vetting process.
Despite formal safeguards, political interference remains endemic. Successive governments have attempted to pull the strings behind the scenes. A key turning point came in 2017, when a court sided with civil society group SOS: Support Public Broadcasting, ruling that government interference in board appointments was unlawful. The court ordered the broadcaster’s memorandum of incorporation to be amended, stripping the Minister of Communications of appointment powers over key executive roles—a legal firewall that remains in place.
Nevertheless, breaches of this separation have persisted. A high-profile example occurred in late 2022, when President Cyril Ramaphosa delayed appointing the incoming board by over six months. Civil society pressure eventually led to the installation of the new board in April 2023, but the episode laid bare the fragility of institutional independence.
In October 2023, the Cabinet approved a controversial new SABC Bill that sought to strengthen ministerial control, including the power to veto board decisions. The proposal drew sharp criticism from watchdogs such as Media Monitoring Africa and SOS, who argued it endangered democratic safeguards. Although the bill was ultimately shelved in March 2024, with elections looming, concerns over creeping executive control remain acute.
Source of funding and budget
SABC has been walking a financial tightrope for years. In 2022, total revenue stood at ZAR 5.04 billion (approx. US$ 292 million), yet the broadcaster posted a loss exceeding ZAR 200 million. Advertising revenue continued to be the lifeblood of the organization, accounting for over 74% of total income.
The broadcaster’s long-standing funding headache—the highly evaded television license fee—has proven increasingly unsustainable. In the 2022/2023 fiscal year, the evasion rate soared to 85%, driven by public dissatisfaction and economic hardship. The fee contributed just 16% of SABC’s revenues, down from previous years, despite being theoretically compulsory for South African households.
A proposed remedy has been circulating in policy circles. In July 2023, the Department of Communications and Digital Technologies proposed scrapping the outdated license model in favor of a ring-fenced tax, to be collected by South African Revenue Service (SARS). A revised funding model was included in the shelved October 2023 SABC Bill, which floated the idea of a household levy—but failed to specify mechanisms or timelines. Officials said a detailed funding framework would only be developed within three years of the law’s eventual adoption.
Meanwhile, the broadcaster’s financial health continued to decline. In FY 2022/2023, SABC recorded its largest loss in 23 years—a staggering ZAR 1.13 billion (US$63 million). The National Treasury rejected a ZAR 1.5 billion bailout in 2023, signaling limited political appetite for further state support. By 2022, direct government funding had shrunk to just 3% of SABC’s total revenue, compared to over 50% in 2019 following a one-time ZAR 3.2 billion subsidy.
The fiscal year 2023/2024 closed with revenue of approximately ZAR 5.1 billion, but the broadcaster still reported an estimated deficit of ZAR 590 million. For FY 2024/2025, the National Treasury forecast a substantial revenue jump to ZAR 6.95 billion, with losses narrowing dramatically to ZAR 27.5 million—a marked improvement over previous years. Projections suggest that SABC may return to profitability by 2026, with profits expected to exceed ZAR 900 million in 2026/2027, provided revenue continues to grow and structural reforms take hold.
These gains are largely attributed to enhanced advertising returns, particularly from the relaunched SABC Plus OTT platform, which has begun to attract meaningful digital ad revenue, tighter internal expenditure controls, and a marginal uptick in license fee collections—though this remains the weakest link in the revenue chain. The TV license fee system is effectively collapsing. Despite being legally mandated, public compliance is at a historic low. In 2025, fewer than 20% of households are reportedly paying the fee, underscoring its irrelevance and public resistance.
While the October 2023 bill proposing a household levy to replace the license fee was shelved in 2024 (ahead of the general election), the issue has reemerged on the post-election agenda. In early 2025, government officials have hinted at a possible levy on digital devices and streaming platforms(such as Netflix and smart TVs), but no formal bill has been tabled.
Editorial independence
On paper, SABC’s editorial mandate is firmly protected. The Broadcasting Act enshrines the broadcaster’s freedom of expression and journalistic independence, while the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) oversees compliance with license conditions. The SABC Editorial Policies, revised in 2020 after public consultations, were heralded at the time as a turning point for institutional independence.
Yet in practice, the firewall between the newsroom and political corridors is often porous. Despite legal protections, editorial capture by the ruling African National Congress (ANC) has been a recurring issue. Under former President Jacob Zuma, newsroom purges and ministerial interference were routine. A 2019 internal commission concluded that “the specter of the ANC hovered over the newsroom,” with ministers routinely intruding on editorial decisions.
Post-Zuma, some progress has been made. Media Monitoring Africa noted that SABC’s coverage of the 2019 and 2021 elections was largely balanced, and more independent voices have surfaced across SABC platforms. Nonetheless, institutional independence remained partial and precarious, as confirmed by numerous interviews with South African journalists and media experts in 2024 and 2025.
SABC’s actual editorial performance in 2025 presents a more nuanced picture. The coverage of the May 2024 general elections was described by local watchdog Media Monitoring Africa (MMA) as “significantly more balanced” compared to prior electoral cycles. SABC platforms gave relatively equitable airtime to opposition parties and carried a range of critical perspectives, including debates on ANC governance and public sector corruption. Moreover, there have been no major reported incidents of journalists being fired or censored for political reasons in 2024 or early 2025.
Yet, according to interviews with journalists at SABC carried out in April-May 2025, several newsroom staff and editors remain aligned with the ruling African National Congress (ANC), a legacy of previous years of capture. Internal editorial decisions continue to be shaped by informal political loyalties and pressure from senior management. Self-censorship persists on sensitive issues, particularly regarding national security, ANC internal conflicts, or ministerial misconduct, according to interviews with current and former SABC journalists conducted by local NGOs in early 2025. Civil society organizations continue to call for greater editorial independence clauses to be legally embedded, including full depoliticization of senior appointments.
In conclusion, while there is greater pluralism and less overt censorship than during the Zuma years, SABC cannot yet be described as fully editorially independent. Its current state can best be described as partially independent, with flashes of journalistic integrity offset by enduring structural and political constraints.
We are keeping a close watch on these developments, as tangible strides in editorial independence could justify SABC’s reclassification into the ‘independent’ tier of the State Media Matrix.
June 2025