Gagauzia Radio Televizionu (GRT)
GRT, the sole broadcaster delivering content in the Gagauz language—a Turkic tongue spoken by Gagauz communities across Moldova, Ukraine, Russia, and Turkey—continues to stand alone globally in preserving and promoting this linguistic heritage. In addition to home‑grown programming, it rebroadcasts selected content from Turkey’s state‐owned TRT.
Media assets
Television: Gagauz TV
Radio: Gagauz Radio
State Media Matrix Typology
Ownership and governance
Legally, GRT operates under the framework of the 2016 Broadcast Act enacted by the Popular Assembly (People’s Assembly) of Gagauzia, in harmony with Moldova’s national Audiovisual Services Code. Its governance mirrors that of the national public broadcaster, TRM: a Supervisory (Observers) Council—appointed exclusively by the regional parliament—sits atop a management structure that includes an Executive (General) Director and deputies. However, critics argue that this arrangement leaves GRT particularly vulnerable to local political interference.
Reports highlight that the 2016 law entitles the Supervisory Council to broad prerogatives—such as approving statutes, strategic direction, staffing, and budgets—creating fertile ground for political maneuvering. Local experts have repeatedly flagged how appointments and dismissals within the Council often align closely with the People’s Assembly’s political inclinations.
Source of funding and budget
To date, GRT has not publicly disclosed a detailed budget. By early 2024, local media and analysts interviewed for this report noted that its finances rely on a patchwork of support: central government transfers, regional Gagauz authority contributions, and periodic aid from Turkish state media partners.
Editorial independence
In theory, GRT is protected under Moldova’s Audiovisual Services Code, which guarantees editorial autonomy. In practice, however, the picture is far murkier.
Media NGOs and press freedom watchdogs have raised persistent red flags: in 2024, GRT was sanctioned for disseminating disinformation under pressure, and monitoring data revealed an almost complete absence of coverage on regional corruption—only two stories in six months, none implicating local officials.
Furthermore, proposed amendments in mid‑2024 from the regional assembly sought to create a parallel licensing mechanism and introduce employee reviews by commissions including political appointees—moves that were widely condemned for undermining both press freedom and national legal coherence.
Recent analyses underscore the burgeoning influence of exiled oligarch Ilan Shor’s network in Gagauzia’s media landscape. The public broadcaster has occasionally rebroadcast content that later appeared on pro‑Shor platforms, fueling concerns over blurred editorial boundaries and influence operations.
August 2025