State and Public Media in Asia in 2025
The state and public media landscape in Asia has undergone dynamic changes in 2025. Although the sector remains heavily dominated by government influence, with over 70% of the 120 public media outlets surveyed in this report still classified as State-Controlled (SC), the overall number of SC outlets has dropped from 92 in 2024 to 86 in 2025. Four significant reclassifications occurred in Indonesia’s public broadcaster TVRI and national radio network RRI, along with Japan’s NHK and South Korea’s KBS, which all have regained editorial independence from state authorities. This shift signals both a pushback by critical journalists and a groundswell of support from the general public.
At the same time, many Asian state-administered media organizations have seen their budgets severely cut, as governments scale back financial support and curtail official incentives for these organizations. Whether these measures reflect genuine efforts at sound fiscal governance or serve as a warning signal from governments unhappy with certain media narratives, the strain on budgets represents a troubling trend across the region.
Efficiency measures have also driven many domestic state-administered media institutions to seek additional funding from Chinese enterprises and to forge closer partnerships with Chinese state media. In particular, China’s expanding media presence and growing influence in leading Southeast Asian media companies has not only provided a lifeline for struggling outlets but has also contributed to shaping a more favorable image of China among Southeast Asian audiences.
Turning first to the encouraging developments, the progress achieved by Indonesia’s TVRI and RRI owes much to the determination of their media professionals, who have pushed both outlets to take a more active role in airing local and national debates, often on politically sensitive and controversial issues, as well as broader social concerns. Despite the absence of an independent commission or an ombudsman-style body to handle public complaints and protect editorial autonomy, both TVRI and RRI are pursuing ambitious digital transformation strategies, emphasizing credibility and adaptability in today’s era of information disruption. The two outlets were also commended for their joint efforts to counter disinformation and hoax campaigns during the 2024 General Election. In parallel, the Indonesian parliament has proposed a bill to merge TVRI, RRI, and ANTARA, the national news agency, into a single media holding, in an effort to accelerate innovation and consolidate resources.
Japan’s world-renowned national broadcaster, NHK, also operating a major English-language international television network, has managed to regain its editorial independence, with no documented cases of direct government intervention in its reporting uncovered since 2024. Like many other state-administered nationwide media companies in Asia, NHK remains highly vulnerable to political interference through board appointments and the pressures of self-censorship, particularly when covering major government scandals. Nevertheless, NHK has historically been regarded as a respected independent public broadcaster committed to providing balanced coverage of Japanese politics. Despite the positive developments in the past year, NHK’s relationship with government officials will require close monitoring.
Similar to NHK, South Korea’s KBS has long stood as a champion of independent public media in Asia throughout its nearly century-long existence. However, in 2024 the State Media Monitor downgraded KBS to the category of Captured State/Public Media (CaPu), citing significant government pressure on its financial autonomy and the cancellation of a major current affairs program under the politically appointed president, Park Min. The political resurgence of the Democratic Party and the electoral victory of its candidate, Lee Jae-myung, in the 2025 General Election reignited debates on KBS’s governance and led to the introduction of a reform bill. Passed in August 2025, the amendment to the Broadcasting Act paves the way for greater public participation in selecting KBS leadership and limits political influence in determining the composition of its new Board of Governors. All of these developments resulted in KBS being reclassified in 2025 as Independent Public (IP), the highest category of independence within the typology applied in this project.
Further improvements may soon materialize in Bangladesh. Following the collapse of former President Sheikh Hasina’s autocratic regime and her self-imposed exile to India, the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus established the Media Reform Commission in September 2024. The commission was given two primary mandates: to secure editorial autonomy for journalists at Bangladesh Television (BTV) and Bangladesh Betar, the country’s flagship public service media outlets, and to review all media-related policies enacted over the past 15 years. In March 2025, the commission also proposed merging BTV, Bangladesh Betar, and BSS, the national news agency, into a unified entity called the National Broadcasting Corporation, overseen by a single regulatory board. At the same time, reforms have begun within the existing media organizations, with new leadership teams drawn from experienced journalists and media professionals, while the creation of an independent oversight body is currently under debate in parliament.
In summary, this past year has witnessed a wave of positive developments across Asia’s state and public media. These shifts may suggest that government control over public media institutions is now facing heightened public scrutiny. At the same time, political interference in editorial independence has become more blatant, provoking widespread pushback against authoritarian leaders.
Nevertheless, a new and troubling trend has also emerged, with governments slashing financial contributions to state-administered media organizations. Officials often justify these measures as part of efficiency drives, introduced in response to global economic uncertainty and geopolitical tensions, including President Donald Trump’s tariff agenda and the ongoing conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine. However, many media experts argue that such cuts are also intended to discourage journalists from pursuing coverage that is critical of ruling governments. Finally, such budget reductions may also reflect the pressures of a broader economic crisis, prompting governments to reassess the value of sustaining propaganda-driven media and, in turn, exposing a more pragmatic, yet instrumental, approach to the role of public media in consolidating political power.
In September 2024, the Nepalese government passed a bill to merge Nepal Television (NTV) and Radio Nepal into a new entity called Public Service Broadcasting Nepal (PSBN), which is described as an effort to “advance the communication industry as a knowledge-based industry” and to promote press freedom. However, instead of granting PSBN full autonomy, the legislation placed it under the direct control of the Ministry of Communications. As part of the restructuring, early retirement packages have been offered to employees of both legacy institutions while the overall organizational framework of PSBN is still under review. The creation of PSBN has also been framed as an efficiency measure, intended to reduce spending from the national budget on media.
Elsewhere in South Asia, a similar proposal was introduced in Sri Lanka in February 2024 to merge the Sri Lanka Rupavahini Corporation (SLRC) and the Sri Lanka Broadcasting Corporation (SLBC) into a single media holding, aimed at addressing financial inefficiencies and reducing service overlap amid operational losses incurred since 2022. However, by June 2025 the government shelved the plan, citing structural incompatibilities between the two organizations, and instead opted to keep SLBC and SLRC separate while pursuing a more unified strategic roadmap. Critics contend that the short-lived merger proposal was less about efficiency and more about exerting pressure on journalists to align more closely with official narratives.
Continuing this wave of austerity-driven restructuring, the Vietnamese government decided to disband Vietnam Digital Television (VTC) and fold its remaining assets into Vietnam Television (VTV), now the country’s sole national broadcaster. VTC had been recognized for offering more diverse programming, particularly in non-political areas such as environmental issues, sports, and niche reporting on rural livelihoods. However, with VTC now fully absorbed into VTV, which functions as the de facto propaganda arm of the Socialist Party, media activists have criticized the move as a narrowing of public discourse and a further intensification of state-driven propaganda.
The wave of austerity has also extended to some of Asia’s most independent public media institutions. In March 2025, Taiwan’s Yuan Parliament passed a budget-cutting amendment that targeted the country’s public media. As a result, PTS, the flagship television network, saw its budget reduced by 25 percent, while TaiwanPlus, the international digital streaming service under the Taiwan Broadcasting System (TBS), faced a 50 percent cut. Media observers warn that such reductions not only threaten the quality and sustainability of Taiwan’s domestic public broadcasting but also undermine Taiwan’s ability to reach international audiences and counterbalance China’s expanding media influence.
These efficiency measures, combined with intense financial pressures on operating costs and the persistent threat of budget cuts, have caused many Asian media organizations to lose editorial autonomy. Without a sustainable funding base, critical news reporting becomes increasingly untenable, creating a potential make-or-break moment for public interest journalism in the region. In response, some media firms have sought international partnerships to attract foreign investment. Yet, as in many other sectors, Asian media companies are increasingly turning to Chinese investors and influence as they expand their networks, a shift that raises serious concerns for their independence.
Vietnam, home to one of the largest Chinese diaspora communities, hosts numerous local media outlets that provide news and programming in Chinese, including Voice of Ho Chi Minh’s People, Sai Gon Giai Phong, the Vietnam News Agency (VNA), and VTV. Most notably, in April 2025 VTV entered into a multi-disciplinary partnership with China Media Group (CMG) to collaborate on co-producing content focused on technology, artificial intelligence, infrastructure, and shared political and cultural milestones. The partnership is framed as a way to strengthen bilateral ties between the two countries and to promote people-to-people diplomacy.
Chinese influence has run deep in the Indochina Peninsula since the late 2010s, as demonstrated by the launch of Chinese-language news portals operated by the Lao Press in Foreign Languages on Chinese social media platforms WeChat and Weibo in 2019. Since 2018, the Chinese government has also been the primary benefactor of Lao National TV, providing equipment upgrades, technical assistance, and direct financial support that has accounted for as much as 40 percent of its annual budget.
Two other ASEAN member states, which clashed in border skirmishes in July 2025, Thailand and Cambodia, are also among the prime recipients of Chinese funding in their public media sectors. Thailand signed an agreement with the Chinese government in 2019 to facilitate news-sharing initiatives between Xinhua News Agency and 12 Thai media outlets, as part of the so-called “ASEAN–China Year of Media Exchange.” Thailand’s largest public media outlet, Thai PBS, faced backlash in 2023 when it allegedly removed an interview with Taiwan’s foreign minister under pressure from Beijing.
On the other hand, Cambodian outlets Fresh News and Nice TV have both reportedly received funding from Chinese central and local government sources to sustain their operations. The explicit support of Fresh News’s CEO, Lim Chea Vutha, for China is well known. With its large online audience, Fresh News has not only become one of the most widely viewed news sources in the country, but it has also developed deep ties to Chinese propaganda, regularly republishing content produced by Xinhua and CGTN in both English and Khmer. Lim has also drawn frequent criticism for his lavish, Beijing-funded trips to China. These cases underscore Cambodia’s heavy dependence on Chinese assistance and highlight its vulnerability as an amplifier of Chinese propaganda.
As Southeast Asia’s largest economy and most populous nation, Indonesia has partnered with China so closely that it mirrors the level of Chinese influence seen among journalists in parts of Africa. Metro TV, Indonesia’s leading television news network, has been broadcasting daily Mandarin-language news programs since 2000 to serve the country’s sizable Chinese Indonesian community. The content was originally produced by local journalists and only later translated and presented in Mandarin. However, in 2019 Metro TV signed an agreement with China Media Group (CMG) to publish and republish Chinese-produced content, following in the footsteps of The Jakarta Post, an English-language newspaper that circulates content from China Daily, and Antara, Indonesia’s official news agency, which entered into similar arrangements with China Global Television Network (CGTN) and Xinhua.
Freedom House has reported that many young Indonesian journalists have been sent to China for journalism training, organized trips, and educational programs. Upon returning, a number of them echo Beijing’s official narratives in a favorable light, including on sensitive issues such as human rights abuses in Xinjiang Province.
China’s overarching influence in the Southeast Asian state media landscape has also extended into Singapore. Despite being a wealthy and relatively liberal nation, Singapore’s largest media conglomerate, SPH Media Trust (SMT), entered into a partnership with Xinhua to deepen media collaboration and, in its own words, “to tell the China–Singapore development story.” Such partnerships could further narrow critical coverage of China and embed state-driven bias within Singapore’s media landscape.
The recent surge in Chinese media presence across Asia has not occurred in a vacuum. Rather, it reflects a broader trend in which more nations are being drawn into Beijing’s orbit through multilateral frameworks such as the Belt and Road Initiative, the Digital Silk Road, and even BRICS. Since the majority of state-administered media organizations in Asia remain under government control, the closer Asian leaders move toward China’s sphere of influence, the more normalized it may become to see Chinese-produced content flooding the region’s information space.
In conclusion, Asia’s state and public media landscape in 2025 is defined by a dual trajectory. On one hand, the reclassification of Indonesia’s TVRI and RRI, Japan’s NHK, and South Korea’s KBS demonstrates that editorial independence can be reclaimed when journalists and citizens push back against political interference. On the other, budget cuts, efficiency drives, and the growing reliance on Chinese partnerships point to a countervailing trend that threatens to deepen state control and external influence. While reforms such as those underway in Bangladesh suggest possible openings for more independent public service media, austerity measures and China’s expanding footprint across the region risk narrowing the space for pluralism and critical reporting. Taken together, these developments reveal a media environment in constant transition, where the struggle for independence is real but increasingly constrained by financial vulnerability and geopolitical pressure.