Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC)
The Middle East Broadcasting Center (MBC) is one of the Arab world’s most influential media conglomerates. Originally launched in London in 1991, the group relocated its headquarters to Dubai Media City in 2002. Today, it operates a suite of widely viewed television and radio channels including MBC1, MBC2, MBC3, MBC4, MBC5, MBC Drama, and the 24-hour news outlet Al Arabiya. The group has expanded its reach with localized channels in Egypt and Iraq, and also owns MBC FM and Panorama FM, both of which command large audiences across the Gulf region.
In August 2023, MBC announced its intention to launch a cultural television channel in partnership with Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Culture. This initiative aligns with the Kingdom’s broader strategy to bolster national identity and promote cultural heritage through state-aligned media platforms.
Media assets
Television: MBC1, MBC MASR, MBC MASR 2, MBC2, MBC3, MBC4, MBC5, MBC Drama, MBC Drama Plus, MBC Max, MBC Bollywood, MBC Power, MBC Action, MBC Wanasah, Al Arabiya, Al Hadath, MBC USA, MBC Iraq, MBC Egypt, MBC Egypt 2
Radio: MBC FM, MBC Panorama FM, MBC USA
State Media Matrix Typology
Captured Public/State-Managed (CaPu)
Ownership and governance
MBC’s ownership structure underwent a dramatic transformation following Saudi Arabia’s high-profile anti-corruption purge in 2017. Its founder, Waleed bin Ibrahim Al Ibrahim—once the sole owner—now holds a minority stake. Following a series of detentions at the Ritz-Carlton in Riyadh, including Al Ibrahim and several family members, the Saudi government secured a 60% stake in the company through Al Istedamah Holding, a state-owned investment vehicle. Al Ibrahim retained a 40% share at that time.
Critics and regional observers interviewed in May 2024 suggested that the anti-corruption campaign served as a pretext for consolidating state control over strategic media assets. The timing of the MBC deal, which followed Al Ibrahim’s release from detention in early 2018, has drawn scrutiny from independent analysts.
In January 2024, MBC took a significant step toward privatization by launching an initial public offering (IPO) on the Tadawul stock exchange. The IPO was jointly underwritten by HSBC and JPMorgan Chase, and shares surged more than 30% on the first day of trading—a testament to market confidence despite underlying political sensitivities.
Post-IPO, the Saudi government retained a 54% controlling interest via Istedamah Holding, while Al Ibrahim’s stake was diluted to 36%. The IPO was framed as part of Saudi Arabia’s broader Vision 2030 blueprint to diversify its economy and reduce dependence on oil revenues by monetizing state-held assets.
Mike Sneesby, previously CEO of Australia’s Nine Network, took the helm as MBC Group CEO in April 2025, succeeding Sam Barnett.
Source of funding and budget
Historically opaque in its financial disclosures, MBC has begun to open its books following its partial public listing. The group is primarily funded through commercial revenue streams, with advertising sales comprising the bulk of its income. Subscription fees, particularly from its rapidly growing video-on-demand platform Shahid, now play a substantial supplementary role.
According to data compiled by the Media and Journalism Research Center (MJRC): Shahid reported a subscriber base of 3.98 million in 2023 and generated SAR 836 million (US$ 223 million)—a 51% increase compared to 2022. In 2023, revenue grew by 6.2% year-on-year, reaching SAR 3.7 billion (approximately US$ 987.7 million). Net profit surged 44.8% to SAR 69 million (US$ 18.5 million).
In 2024, revenue and net profit climbed compared to 2023. Profit for the year ended December 31 2024 hit SAR 426.1 million.
This commercial performance underscores MBC’s resilience in an increasingly fragmented digital media landscape and its strategic pivot toward online content monetization.
Editorial independence
Since the Saudi government assumed majority control, MBC’s editorial direction has visibly aligned with Riyadh’s political and geopolitical objectives. Its channels are widely regarded as tools of Saudi statecraft, deployed to project soft power, reinforce national narratives, and counter messaging from regional adversaries, particularly Iran and Qatar.
No independent statute, regulatory framework, or third-party oversight mechanism exists to ensure or verify the editorial independence of MBC or its subsidiaries. Consequently, MBC falls outside the commonly accepted definitions of editorial autonomy as recognized by international media freedom standards.
July 2025