Vietnam Television (VTV)

Vietnam Television is the national broadcaster and, since 1 April 2026, no longer an agency of the government. Under Politburo Decision 15-QĐ/TW it became a public non-business (public service) unit of the Communist Party of Vietnam’s Central Committee, placed under the direct and regular leadership of the Politburo and the Secretariat. Its General Director is concurrently a Deputy Head of the Central Propaganda and Mass Mobilization Commission, the body that supervises the broadcaster’s political and ideological work. The transfer moved VTV from the Government directly into the institutional structure of the Party Central Committee, a major institutional change. It did not alter the broadcaster’s finances, which remain predominantly commercial.

Media assets

Television: VTV1, VTV2, VTV3, VTV4, VTV5 with its Central Highlands and Southwest regional services, VTV6, VTV7, VTV8, VTV9 and VTV10

Digital: VTVgo streaming platform, VTV News, Thời báo VTV, and applications for news, entertainment and sport

Commercial: the Advertising and Copyright Exploitation Centre, the pay-television operator VTVcab, and other subsidiary enterprises

Structure: 23 subordinate units at departmental level, including the News Department, the Programme Department, regional television centres for the South and for the Central Region and Central Highlands, a Digital Platforms and Services Centre, and the College of Television, together with a network of overseas bureaux

The channel line-up was reorganised extensively in 2026. VTV Cần Thơ became VTV10 from midnight on 30 March 2026, repositioned around agriculture, rural affairs and green growth. VTV8 was converted on 28 May 2026 from a Central Region and Central Highlands service into a national channel for culture, heritage, history and tourism. The VTV6 identity, dormant since 2022, returned on 8 June 2026 as the national sports channel, licensed by the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism on 2 June and launched days before the 2026 World Cup.

Ownership and governance

The 2026 transfer proceeded quickly and from the top. On 25 March 2026 the second plenum of the 14th Central Committee adopted Resolution 03-NQ/TW, agreeing to move VTV, Voice of Vietnam, Vietnam News Agency and the two national academies from government agencies to non-business units of the Central Committee, with completion required before 1 April. On 30 March, Trần Cẩm Tú, Politburo member and Permanent Member of the Secretariat, signed Decision 15-QĐ/TW setting out VTV’s functions, tasks and structure. It took effect on 1 April, and a ceremony at Party headquarters that morning transferred the five bodies and moved their party organisations from the Government Party Committee to the Party Committee of Central Party Agencies.

The decision states VTV’s position without ambiguity. It is a public non-business unit of the Central Committee under the direct and regular leadership of the Politburo and Secretariat. It is described as the multi-platform, multilingual key press and communications organ of the Party and State, holding a core role in ideological and cultural work, participating in orienting public opinion and consolidating the people’s confidence in the Party, the State and the socialist system.

Appointment now runs through the Party rather than the government. Nguyễn Thanh Lâm was originally appointed General Director on 1 November 2024 by Prime Ministerial Decision 1311/QĐ-TTg for a five-year term, moving from the post of Deputy Minister of Information and Communications; he had earlier directed VTC and headed the Press Department and the Broadcasting and Electronic Information Department. He was elected to the 14th Central Committee on 22 January 2026, and on 30 March the Politburo issued Decision 88-QĐNS/TW assigning him as General Director while concurrently serving as Deputy Head of the Central Propaganda and Mass Mobilization Commission. Leadership comprises the General Director and no more than four deputies, currently Đinh Đắc Vĩnh, Đỗ Thanh Hải, Đỗ Đức Hoàng and Lê Quyền.

Two provisions define the reporting relationship. The General Director is responsible to the Politburo and the Secretariat for the organisation, management and results of the broadcaster, and VTV reports to them periodically and on demand through the Party’s organs and the Central Office. Separately, the Central Propaganda and Mass Mobilization Commission advises the Politburo and Secretariat on political direction and professional tasks for VTV, and guides, inspects and supervises the political and ideological content of its work. The commission of which the General Director is a deputy head therefore also supervises the broadcaster he runs.

The wider political context is one of consolidation. Tô Lâm, General Secretary since August 2024, was re-elected at the 14th National Congress in January 2026 and resumed the state presidency on 7 April 2026. Lê Minh Hưng became Prime Minister the same day, confirmed by the 16th National Assembly, succeeding Phạm Minh Chính.

Source of funding and budget

VTV finances itself principally from commercial activity, and the 2026 transfer did not change that.

Official broadcasting statistics for 2023 put VTV’s total resources at approximately 3,876.55 billion dong, of which about 374.42 billion came from the state budget and about 3,502.13 billion from service revenue. State budget support therefore accounted for roughly 9.7 per cent of the total, and the same source places VTV among broadcasters that self-finance both recurrent and investment expenditure. VTV reported revenue exceeding 3.64 trillion dong for 2024. Its published state budget expenditure estimate for 2026 was 329.81 billion dong, later supplemented by a further 300.47 billion, much of the latter earmarked for specified political and public service tasks.

Decision 15-QĐ/TW makes VTV a first-level budget estimating unit of the Central Budget, managing its own finances and assets and deciding on its own investment projects. It applies a self-financing and self-responsibility mechanism, operates a financial and salary regime based on performance in the manner of a state enterprise, and is stated to operate not for profit. Where competent authorities assign political tasks, the state budget guarantees funding for those tasks.

The arrangements are transitional. For the 2026 budget year VTV continues under the existing financial and asset management regime, and the decision directs the Government Party Committee to have the Government issue guidance for a new regime to apply from the 2027 budget year. A separate provision requires VTV to work with relevant bodies on a specific financial mechanism of its own.

Commercial income runs across several businesses. VTV sells advertising through a dedicated centre, exercises the rights of a state owner over enterprises in which public capital has been invested, and operates pay-television and digital services. It publishes budget disclosure documents on its corporate portal, including approved estimates and settlement figures, but State Media Monitor identified no consolidated audited financial statements in the public domain and no current breakdown separating budget support from commercial revenue.

Editorial independence

No Vietnamese law provides for the editorial independence of VTV, and the 2026 decision makes the opposite explicit. Among the tasks it assigns are protecting the ideological foundation of the Party and refuting what it terms the erroneous and hostile views and distortions of hostile, opportunist and reactionary forces; countering harmful information in television, digital media and cyberspace; participating in the fight against corruption, waste, negativity, “self-evolution” and “self-transformation”; orienting public opinion on important, complex and sensitive matters; and consolidating the people’s confidence in the Party’s leadership. VTV decides its own daily content and scheduling, but does so within Party regulations and under the political and ideological supervision of the Central Propaganda and Mass Mobilization Commission.

The legal framework was rewritten during the review period. On 10 December 2025 the National Assembly passed both a new Press Law, number 126/2025/QH15, and a new Cybersecurity Law, number 116/2025/QH15, each in force from 1 July 2026. The Press Law expressly regulates press activity and content channels in cyberspace, including social platforms and a national digital press platform, and adds permitted revenue sources for press organisations. It also expands state access to journalistic sources: earlier legislation already allowed sources to be required in very serious criminal cases, and the new law gives heads of relevant police investigative bodies direct written authority to require disclosure to serve investigation, prosecution and adjudication. Separately, the state press management authority may require the removal of violating content. The 2025 Cybersecurity Law replaced the legislation that had operated since 2019.

AI and digital policy

Vietnam has moved further on artificial intelligence regulation than any other country State Media Monitor maps in Southeast Asia. The National Assembly passed the Law on Artificial Intelligence, number 134/2025/QH15, on 10 December 2025 with 90.7 per cent of deputies in favour, and it took effect on 1 March 2026. It is the first standalone AI law in the region and draws heavily on the European Union’s AI Act, establishing risk classification, incident response duties and an AI information centre.

Article 11 is the provision that bears on broadcasting. Providers must mark AI-generated audio, images and video in a machine-readable format. Deployers must notify the public where AI-generated or AI-edited text, audio, images or video could cause confusion about the authenticity of events or persons, and must apply visible labels to content simulating a real person’s appearance or voice or recreating real events, with labelling for artistic works implemented so as not to obstruct display. Implementation detail followed in Decree 142/2026/NĐ-CP, effective 1 May 2026, covering transparency, risk classification and related obligations, with technical standards and further guidance still to come. Grace periods for most existing systems run to 1 March 2027.

The Press Law adds a media-specific hook: press organisations and journalists using AI must comply with intellectual property law, the AI Law and professional ethics. Vietnam therefore has both a binding general transparency regime and an explicit statutory link governing AI use in journalism, which distinguishes it sharply from Thailand and Singapore, where newsroom AI standards remain voluntary.

Classification rationale

VTV is classified Captured Public/State-Managed (CaPu).

It is Party-operated and Party-governed, with the qualification that in a single-party state the distinction between party and state institutions is formal rather than substantive. VTV has no separate corporate personality, no shareholders and no governing board. Until 1 April 2026 it was an agency of the government; it is now a non-business unit of the Communist Party’s Central Committee, which moves it closer to the centre of political authority rather than further from it. The General Director is appointed by the Politburo, reports to the Politburo and the Secretariat, and concurrently holds office as a Deputy Head of the Party commission that supervises his broadcaster’s political and ideological work. There is no independent appointing body, no protected tenure, and no oversight mechanism outside the Party structure.

Its editorial agenda is directed by the state. The governing decision assigns it the tasks of protecting the Party’s ideological foundation, refuting hostile viewpoints, orienting public opinion and consolidating popular confidence in the Party and the socialist system. No statute, charter or oversight body offers any counterweight.

Predominant state funding is not demonstrated, and this is the condition that places VTV in CaPu rather than State-Controlled. Official 2023 statistics show state budget support at roughly 9.7 per cent of total resources, with service revenue supplying the remainder, and identify VTV among broadcasters that self-finance both recurrent and investment spending. Nothing in the 2024 to 2026 record establishes a reversal: reported revenue exceeded 3.64 trillion dong in 2024, and published 2026 budget estimates remain a fraction of that. The April 2026 transfer strengthened Party governance without converting commercial revenue into state funding.

This is a classification correction rather than a change in the broadcaster’s characteristics. The financing evidence predates the transfer, which indicates that VTV was already predominantly self-financing while still a government agency.

The variable to watch is the financial regime due to take effect for the 2027 budget year. If the Party-era mechanism shifts VTV toward state budget financing representing more than half of total resources, State-Controlled would become the appropriate classification.

August 2026