Channel One

Channel One is Russia’s principal federal television channel, broadcasting around the clock from the Ostankino technical centre in Moscow since 1 April 1995. It was founded on 24 January 1995 as Public Russian Television, ORT, and took its present name in 2002. It remains on Russia’s list of strategic organisations.

Media assets

National television: Channel One

Thematic television distributed through Channel One Worldwide: Dom Kino, Dom Kino Premium, Vremya, Telecafe, Muzyka Pervogo, Bober, O! and Poekhali!

Joint service: Carousel, operated with VGTRK

International distribution: Pervyy Kanal. Vsemirnaya Set

Ownership and governance

A December 2020 presidential decree required Channel One to increase its capital and reduce the Russian Federation’s direct voting interest to no less than 34 per cent, and the recapitalisation was implemented in 2021.

The latest publicly documented post-transaction structure is the Russian Federation at 34.23 per cent, VTB at 32.89 per cent, National Media Group at 19.46 per cent and Sogaz at 13.42 per cent. The state also retained a special management right, commonly described as a golden share. VTB completed its acquisition of 32.89 per cent in September 2021 and remains a state-controlled bank.

Channel One is therefore not directly majority state-owned, while remaining firmly state-linked and state-managed.

Government involvement in governance is direct. Channel One has a board of directors, but State Media Monitor identified no independent editorial or supervisory mechanism separating management from the state and state-controlled shareholders. The Government’s 2026 nominees to the board included the Deputy Head of the Presidential Administration Maxim Oreshkin, the Digital Development Minister Maksut Shadayev and the senior Government Office official Leonid Levin.

Konstantin Ernst became acting General Director in September 1999 and General Director on 6 October 1999, and remained in post in 2026. He has been sanctioned by the European Union, whose designation connects him specifically to Channel One’s propaganda role.

Source of funding and budget

Channel One is financed through a combination of advertising revenue and state subsidies.

Published analysis of the 2026 budget documentation identifies approximately RUB 6 billion for Channel One’s programme schedule and RUB 268.5 million for coverage of the Victory Day parade. The channel also benefits from a shared programme of RUB 20.68 billion financing the distribution of first-multiplex channels, but its individual share of that programme was not established.

The financial record shows sustained losses reversed by subsidy. Channel One recorded losses from 2014 onward: RUB 1.56 billion in 2017, a fourfold increase in 2018, and RUB 4.15 billion in 2019. In 2020 revenue fell 6.7 per cent to RUB 25.2 billion, yet the channel posted a net profit of RUB 6.3 billion, attributable to state subsidies rather than to trading performance. The published record describes that year as a spectacular rebound without noting the cause.

Revenue reached approximately RUB 28 billion in 2021, with net profit falling to RUB 581 million. Subsidies in 2022 were RUB 6.27 billion.

Consultants engaged by the channel assessed that it required RUB 6.5 billion annually in 2018 to 2021, and RUB 5 billion annually in 2022 to 2025, to stabilise its position.

Editorial independence

Channel One’s editorial agenda is directed by the state, and the evidence is specific.

Reporters Without Borders reports that senior editorial staff at Russia’s major media receive instructions from the Presidential Administration about subjects to cover or avoid. The European Union sanctioned Konstantin Ernst for his role in Channel One’s propaganda activity, and included the channel itself in the broadcasting restrictions adopted in December 2022. Its board includes senior executive officials and representatives of state-linked shareholders.

Russia’s Law on Mass Media recognises freedom to seek, receive, produce and distribute mass information in Article 1; prohibits censorship and prior approval in Article 3; limits founder interference, subject to the law, charter and founding agreement, in Article 18; and provides for an editorial office to operate on the basis of professional independence in Article 19.

Those are formal safeguards rather than structural independence. Article 18 permits intervention where authorised by law, charter or agreement, and permits founders to require publication of founder statements.

AI and digital policy

State Media Monitor could not identify a published Channel One policy governing generative artificial intelligence, mandatory human verification, model provenance or audience disclosure, and could not establish the extent of adoption in production.

Russia enacted Federal Law No. 243-FZ on 26 July 2026. Article 9, which takes effect on 1 March 2027, requires relevant large-model providers and major online platforms to make available a mechanism through which audio or visual material created using such models can carry an AI-use warning. It does not impose a universal obligation on media organisations to label every item produced or assisted by artificial intelligence.

Classification rationale

Channel One remains classified Captured Public or State Managed/Owned Media (CaPu).

It is a mixed-ownership company under documented state management and influence. Following the recapitalisation completed in 2021, the Russian Federation’s direct holding fell to 34.23 per cent and the state retained a golden share. VTB, a state-controlled bank, acquired 32.89 per cent; National Media Group held 19.46 per cent and Sogaz 13.42 per cent. These are the latest publicly documented figures, and no more recent shareholder register was identified.

State involvement extends beyond shareholding. Channel One remains a strategic organisation, and the Government nominates senior state officials to its board of directors. State Media Monitor identified no independent editorial or supervisory mechanism separating the broadcaster’s management from the state and state-controlled shareholders.

It is commercially financed alongside substantial state support. The 2026 budget documentation identifies approximately RUB 6 billion for programme content and RUB 268.5 million for Victory Day parade coverage, alongside a shared first-multiplex distribution programme whose individual share was not established. In the latest years for which comparable figures were identified, direct subsidy remained below half of the channel’s total resources; no recent accounts permit that proportion to be confirmed for 2026.

Its editorial agenda is directed by the state. Reporters Without Borders reports Presidential Administration instructions to major media about subjects to cover or avoid. The European Union has sanctioned Ernst for disseminating state propaganda and included the channel in its December 2022 broadcasting restrictions. The formal protections of the Law on Mass Media do not create structural autonomy here.

The classification rests on mixed ownership combined with the state’s golden share, the position of state-controlled VTB, direct government representation in governance and documented editorial direction. It does not rest on any assertion that the Russian Federation directly owns a majority.

September 2026