Mongolia National Broadcaster (MNB)

MNB is Mongolia’s only public service media group and the country’s oldest broadcasting institution. Mongolian Radio was established in 1934 and Mongolian National Television in 1967, both operating under the authority of the Central Committee of the Mongolian People’s Revolutionary Party until the democratic transition. The Law on Public Radio and Television, adopted on 27 January 2005, entered into force on 1 July 2005, and MNB was formally registered under the new public service structure on 8 February 2006. The law began dismantling the state broadcasting monopoly and restricted the national broadcaster’s advertising revenue to leave commercial space for private channels. MNB has the largest audience in the country.

Media assets

Television: five channels, comprising MNB1, Mongolian News, MNB Sport, MNB World and MNB Family

Radio: four services, comprising Mongolian National Radio, Altan San Radio, P3 FM 100.9 and Voice of Mongolia, the international service

Digital: mnb.mn and news.mnb.mn

Television remains the dominant medium in Mongolia, accounting for at least 60 per cent of the market.

Ownership and governance

MNB operates as a non-profit public service broadcaster under the 2005 law. Its highest authority is the fifteen-member National Council for Public Radio and Television, whose appointment process contains real safeguards alongside its political exposure. Members must be proposed from civil society, with candidates channelled through the President for four seats, Parliament for seven and Government for four; the State Great Khural then formally appoints all fifteen following candidate hearings. Members serve six-year terms, and serving political and state officials, party leadership figures and certain holders of media interests are excluded.

The Council appoints and dismisses the Director-General, who by law may not be a member of a political party, and approves the selection procedure for deputy directors and heads of organisational units, whom the Director-General then appoints after competition results are presented to the Council.

Gankhuyag Gerel is Director-General, signing the 2025 annual report in that capacity. N. Monsor was re-elected chair of the National Council on 8 August 2026. Parliament changed Council membership on 2 July 2026, appointing D. Gün-Üils, D. Myagmarsüren, S. Od-Erdene and M. Törmanlai, and releasing S. Altantsetseg, D. Batsükh, V. Bat-Erdene, N. Jantsan and D. Ulziibaatar on the expiry of their terms.

Broadcast licensing is vested in the Communications Regulatory Commission, which issues, renews, modifies, suspends, restores and revokes licences and monitors compliance. Its institutional independence from the executive is limited: under the Communications Law the Prime Minister appoints the Commission’s chair and members, and the Commission reports its work and budget execution to Government.

Source of funding and budget

MNB published its 2025 activity and financial report on 12 August 2026, providing current figures for the first time in several years.

The report records revenue of MNT 23.4 billion against expenditure of MNT 24.2 billion. Revenue comprised MNT 9.5 billion in state budget support, approximately 40.6 per cent of the total; MNT 9.0 billion in broadcasting service fees, approximately 38.5 per cent; MNT 4.0 billion in broadcasting revenue; and MNT 811.4 million from hosting ABU Robocon 2025.

The household payment is MNT 1,100 per month and has remained unchanged since 1998. It is not an ordinary subscription: the public service broadcasting law imposes it statutorily, and its amount is determined by the Government on the proposal of the National Council.

That composition resolves a question that was previously open. Direct state budget support is below half of MNB’s revenue, at approximately 41 per cent. Taken together with the statutory broadcasting fee, public and government-set sources account for approximately 79 per cent of 2025 revenue. Whether the funding condition is met therefore depends on how the State Media Matrix treats a compulsory levy whose rate is set by Government, rather than on any absence of financial data.

Editorial independence

Article 34.2 of the public service broadcasting law gives MNB employees the right to protect confidential sources, subject to a limited court exception. Reporters Without Borders records that Mongolia more generally still lacks basic legal protection for source confidentiality, and that flawed defamation laws facilitate arbitrary lawsuits against journalists, inciting self-censorship.

The most significant recent evidence concerns election coverage. OSCE and ODIHR monitoring of the 2024 parliamentary elections found that MNB and several private channels showed a visible preference towards the ruling party. MNB provided free airtime to candidates, but the monitored presentation was skewed.

The law establishes an oversight framework, comprising the National Council, a Control Board and a Complaints Committee, with the Council also charged with monitoring whether programming complies with the law. Those bodies are internal to the structure and are not insulated from the political appointment process that constitutes them.

AI and digital policy

State Media Monitor identified no publicly available MNB editorial policy governing generative artificial intelligence, mandatory human verification, model provenance or disclosure of AI-assisted material to audiences.

MNB’s 2025 annual report states an intention to conduct regular professional training for creative staff in artificial intelligence and programme planning, which establishes institutional capacity building without indicating how generative AI is used editorially.

State Media Monitor identified no generally applicable Mongolian statutory requirement obliging broadcasters to label AI-generated content.

Classification rationale

MNB remains classified State-Controlled Media (SC).

It is publicly owned and politically governed, with formal safeguards that have not prevented political influence. All fifteen National Council members are ultimately appointed by the State Great Khural, though through a process requiring civil society nomination, six-year terms and statutory exclusion of political officials and party leaders. The Council appoints the Director-General, who may not be a party member. Those safeguards are real and should be acknowledged; studies nonetheless documented recurrent political influence over senior appointments, and the current evidence indicates the safeguards have not been sufficient.

Evidence indicates material political influence over editorial output. OSCE and ODIHR monitoring of the 2024 parliamentary elections observed a visible preference towards the ruling party in MNB’s coverage. That establishes demonstrable bias rather than direct instruction, but it is contemporary, external and specific. The oversight bodies established by law are internal to a politically appointed structure.

The funding condition turns on methodology rather than evidence. Direct state budget support was 40.6 per cent of MNB’s revenue in 2025, below half. The statutory broadcasting fee, whose rate the Government sets on the National Council’s proposal, supplied a further 38.5 per cent, bringing public and government-set sources to approximately 79 per cent. Whether that satisfies the Matrix depends on the treatment of the levy, and the same question arises for other fee-funded public broadcasters in the region.

August 2026